When the historic
unanimous decision was reversed at the urging of
George W. Bush's Attorney General (Remember
Elian?, CounterPunch, August 11, 2009),
the same 3-judge panel was to hear the remaining
issues other than venue, which had been the one upon
which they had expressed their landmark opinion.
However, in the meantime, one jurist, the oldest and
most liberal, had retired and somebody else was
designated to substitute for him. The one chosen for
that role was a Bush recess appointee, William H.
Pryor, whose nomination, described as “one of the
most contentious in recent history”, had provoked
uproar in the Senate, which confirmed him over the
opposition of 45 Senators. (For a detailed
investigation into Pryor's legal career see
Jeffrey St. Clair's Pryor Unrestraint,
CounterPunch, June 14, 2003.)
Senator Kerry, claimed
that the new judge “has been a constant advocate for
scaling back constitutionally guaranteed rights”
with his “consistent pursuit of extreme and
incorrect legal views … as a result our Federal
judiciary will have less ability to protect the
constitutional rights we hold so dear”
(Congressional record, Senate June 14, 2005).
Pryor was criticized by some major
newspapers, and was described as a “right wing
zealot not fit to judge”. In summing up his pedigree
Jeffrey St. Clair writes: “he goes much, much
farther than even many of the most extreme
ideologues in his party”
(“Pryor Unrestraint”, CounterPunch, June 14,
2003).
Mr. Pryor wrote the opinion for the
Court rejecting the other issues presented by the
defense in language that at times was closer to a
slanderous anti-Cuban vulgar diatribe than to the
balanced, sober style of the judiciary (even some
well-known terrorists, rightly described as such by
the previous panel, were now transmuted into
patriotic freedom fighters). Interestingly the
accusation of “spying” was so clumsily fabricated
and the Miami trial included other wrongs so obvious
that even Pryor had to agree with the other two
judges in vacating the sentences of three of the
defendants. (Spies
Without Espionage, CounterPunch August 28-30,
2009).
This time the panel was divided on a
very crucial point: Count 3, conspiracy to commit
murder. One of the judges, J. Birch, while
concurring with Pryor’s opinion recognized that
“this issue presents a very close case” and
reiterated “that the motion for change of venue
should have been granted” adding that “the
defendants were subjected to such a degree of harm
based upon demonstrated pervasive community
prejudice that their convictions should have been
reversed” (US Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit N. 01-17176, DC
Docket No. 98- 00721 CR-JAL, Page 83).
Judge Phillys Kravitch,
in an impressive 15-page dissent, demonstrated the
terrible injustice committed by her colleagues
against Gerardo Hernández.
She pointed out:
“A country cannot
lawfully shoot down aircraft in international
airspace, in contrast to a country shooting down
foreign aircraft within its own territory when the
pilots of those aircrafts are repeatedly warned to
respect territorial boundaries, have dropped objects
over the territory, and when the objective of the
flights is to destabilize the country’s political
system. Thus, the question of whether the Government
provided sufficient evidence to support Hernández’s
conviction turns on whether it presented sufficient
evidence to prove that he entered into an agreement
to shoot down the planes in international, as
opposed to Cuban airspace” (Idem Pages
94-95) and in this regard “the Government
cannot point to any evidence” (Idem Page
98).
But beyond the issue of
the location of the incident “the Government failed
to provide sufficient evidence that Hernández
entered into an agreement to shoot down the planes
at all. None of the intercepted communications the
Government provided at trial show an agreement to
shoot down the planes. At best, the evidence shows
an agreement to 'confront' BTTR planes. But a
'confrontation' does not necessarily means a shoot
down.”
To prove her point she referred to
testimonies and videotapes presented at trial: “This
evidence demonstrates the obvious: there are many
ways a country could “confront” foreign aircraft.
But the Government presented no evidence that when
Hernandez agreed to help “confront” BTTR that he
agreed confrontation would be a shoot down. To
conclude that the evidence does show this goes
beyond mere inferences to the realm of speculation …
Because so much evidence points towards a
“confrontation” other than a shoot down, I cannot
say that a reasonable jury – given all the evidence
– could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hernandez agreed to a shoot down.” (Idem
Pages 96-97)
It was so obvious that
the Government itself had recognized the point in an
“unprecedented” emergency petition to that very
Court of Appeals: to demonstrate Gerardo’s invented
guilt on such a fabricated crime constituted an
“insurmountable obstacle” for the prosecution.
Such would have been the
case with “a reasonable jury” in any other venue.
But not in Miami, where the intimidated jurors where
surrounded at the courtroom by a bunch of
individuals who proclaimed their terrorist exploits
and were able to kidnap Elian Gonzalez, always with
total impunity, and joined the Government in
demanding the worst punishment for Gerardo. That
could have been understood by any reasonable jurist.
But not by a “right wing zealot not fit to judge.”
Somebody at the White
House was happy. His appointee served him well.
Gerardo got his two life sentences confirmed with
the reluctant and paradoxical vote of a judge,
Birtch, who insisted that all of the Five
“convictions should have been reversed” and a
dignified lady who maintained her dissenting voice:
“the Government presented no evidence” to sustain
its accusation.
After Pryor’s shame
judgement, the Five appealed to the en banc Court.
This time they were not contesting an unanimous and
well founded decision – as the Government did in
2005 – but one clearly unfair and prejudicial that
had sharply divided the panel on Count Three, with
Kravitch rejecting it with impeccable consistency
and Birtch – after recognizing her arguments, but
ignoring the presumption of innocence and his own
“reasonable doubts” – strangely decided to join
Pryor’s pro-Government stance and neocon logic.
But this time the Court
of Appeals confirmed the disputable conclusions of
the panel. The Atlanta judges even forgot that it
was to them that the same Government had made an
“emergency petition” admitting that it had failed to
prove Gerardo’s guilt.