Just a couple of days
after the Clinton White House encounter with García
Márquez, US diplomats in Havana approached Cuban
authorities. We had a number of discussions
specially focused on what the US had found about
terrorist plots against civilian aircrafts and the
warning that the FAA felt obliged to issue. In the
course of those exchanges the US asked formally for
a high level FBI delegation to come to Havana with a
view toward receiving from their counterparts our
intelligence concerning the ongoing terrorist
campaign. In preparation for that visit an
Assistant Secretary of State, John Hamilton,
communicated that “this time they would like to
emphasize the seriousness of the United States offer
to investigate any evidence that [Cuba] might have.”
The meetings were
held in Havana on June 16-17, 1998. The US team was
given copious information, both documentary and
testimonies. The material handed over included the
investigations related to 31 terrorist acts, having
taken place between 1990 and 1998, including
detailed information on the financing of the most
dangerous actions carried out by Luis Posada
Carriles’s network. The information included lists
and photographs of weapons, explosives and other
material seized in each case. Additionally, 51 pages
with evidence concerning how the money was routed to
various groups for terrorist acts on the island. The
FBI also received tapes recording 14 phone
conversations in which Posada Carriles referred to
violent attacks against Cuba. Specific data was
provided on how to locate the notorious murderer,
such as his home addresses, places he frequented,
and his car number plates in El Salvador, Honduras,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and
Panama.
The FBI took the
files of 40 Cuban-born terrorists, most living in
Miami, and the clues to find each individual. The US
delegation brought back with them three 2-gramme
samples of explosive substances from the bombs
deactivated before they could have exploded in the
Melia Cohiba Hotel on April 30, 1997 and in a
tourist van on October 19, 1997, as well as the
explosive device confiscated from two Guatemalans on
March 4, 1998.
The FBI was also
given 5 video and 8 audio cassettes and their
transcripts with statements by the Central Americans
who had been arrested for placing bombs in hotels.
There they talked about their links to Cuban gangs
and in particular to Posada Carriles.
The US side
acknowledged the value of the information and made a
commitment to reply as soon as possible.
We never got a word
back. Nobody knows for sure what the FBI did with
the evidence and the thorough information they
received in Havana. They certainly did not use it to
arrest any of the criminals or to open any
investigations.
Wasn’t the State
Department any more worried with the information it
had gathered on its own concerning terrorist attacks
against commercial airlines? What happened with
their preoccupation with the lives and security of
passengers, including American passengers?
Is that the way to
“take immediate steps” on a problem “worthy of the
full attention of his Government, of which they
would urgently take care” as solemnly promised at
the White House? Or “to emphasize the seriousness of
the United States”?
It may be assumed
that the FBI shared the information they got with
their pals in Miami.
If facts have any
meaning this must have been the case. On September
12, 1998, almost three months after the visit to
Havana, we learnt through the media about the
detention of Gerardo, Ramón, Antonio, Fernando and
René and that Mr. Pesquera, the FBI chief in Miami,
was, on that Saturday morning, visiting with Ileana
Ros Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart – the
Batista-Miami Congresspersons – to inform them of
the incarceration of the five Cubans.
History repeated
itself. In 1996 President Clinton gave instructions
to stop Brothers to the Rescue air provocations, but
when his orders reached Miami, the local mob
conspired to do exactly the opposite. In 1998 the
very same President appeared to be willing to put an
end to terrorist attacks against Cuba – and also
against Americans – but when his intentions were
learnt in Miami, the FBI there blew them out.
Mr. Pesquera has
recognized in a press interview that his main
difficulty was in getting Washington’s authorization
to apprehend the Five. It should have been very hard,
indeed. Was not Washington supposed to be on the
other side of the fence in the fight against
terrorism?
But Mr. Pesquera and
his cronies, won. They proved being able to ignore
law and decency, and to ridicule again the US
Commander in Chief. Remember Elian?
