We finally know exactly what the Government Program to correct distortions and revive the economy entails, which undoubtedly represents a technically sound effort by our authorities to pull the country out of the severe crisis it finds itself in.

We now have the opportunity to express our opinion. However, there are specific issues that substantially alter the nature of this consultation.

ARCHITECTURE OF AMBITION

The Program is structured around 10 interconnected general objectives, broken down into 106 specific goals and 342 concrete actions. Its backbone rests on 264 quantifiable indicators and targets that are expected to measure progress objectively.

Its main axes range from macroeconomic stabilization, perhaps the most mentioned to date, with fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate measures to reduce inflation and the fiscal deficit, to increasing national production, with an emphasis on food, another recurring theme in public interventions by political and government leaders, both at the national and provincial levels. Likewise, the transformation of socialist state-owned enterprises and the strategic management of territorial development complete its productive pillars.

One of the most controversial aspects is the explicit recognition of the “partial dollarization of the economy,” which implies the coexistence of the Cuban peso with the US dollar in a “new mechanism for the management, control, and allocation of foreign currency.” It is also established as a strategic task “to recover the convertibility of the national currency.”

This is not a minor detail, since in the debates on the guidelines for the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution, outlined at the Sixth Party Congress, the goal was set to move toward a predominance of the Cuban peso over foreign currencies, especially the so-called greenback. However, it is now clear that this aspiration was buried by the harshness of subsequent events.

Nevertheless, we are not faced with a proposal for something that is completely “to be done,” as was the case at the time with the guidelines themselves or the conceptualization of our socialist model. We are faced with something that is “in full development,” as a memorable journalist would say.

Let us remember that the foundations and general lines of this program were announced at the end of 2023, although it was mentioned more formally at the beginning of 2024, when the goal of “correcting distortions and reviving the economy” became part of the official discourse.

Although the public did not have access to the details, government structures at different levels had begun to work on it since then, based on guidelines that, 18 months later, we now know in greater detail.

Therefore, this is a program in progress and, in my opinion, it should be interpreted as such. That includes its results, whatever they may be. Is it possible to do so?

It seems so, because in the middle of this year, before the National Assembly, the new leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP in Spanish) assessed compliance with the guidelines set out to correct distortions and boost the economy.

A couple of months later, the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC in Spanish) at the University of Havana resumed its reports on domestic economic performance, an examination that involved a review of a tacitly declared official strategy. So, through both of these, we may have some idea of whether what we read in the final stretch of 2025 has worked or not.

PROGRESS, STAGNATION, AND SETBACKS

The cross-analysis of the above reveals a harsh reality: setbacks far outweigh progress, despite the program's meticulous design.

Only three areas show tangible progress. The most significant is the expansion of non-state economic actors, although the MEP itself acknowledged before the legislature that they are too concentrated in services and trade, when it would be desirable for them to focus on the production of material goods, preferably import substitutes.

Inflation control is emerging as another measurable positive development, as prices continue to rise, but at a slower pace. In addition, self-financing schemes in foreign currency are underway, representing a promising mechanism for reviving exports, although their impact is still limited.

Without being experts, we already knew that areas vital to any recovery are in a worrying state: The National Electric Energy System, highlighted in general objective number 9, maintained a lower generation level than in 2024, according to official data, with renewable sources representing only 6.4 percent of the energy matrix. Daily blackouts continue to strangle productive activity, contradicting the lofty goals of recovery in distributed generation.

Sugar production, positioned as an essential part of the goal of increasing national production, closed with the worst figures since the end of the 19th century, and with only half of the cane planting completed. The transformation of the socialist state-owned enterprise, meanwhile, showed signs of stagnation halfway through the current calendar year, according to the CEEC.

The overall figures paint a bleak picture. The Cuban economy is now 11 percent smaller than five years ago, with gross domestic product contracting. Primary activities—agriculture, livestock, and mining—according to the MEP and academic analysis, have recorded a catastrophic 53 percent decline.

The external sector, key to any recovery due to its interaction with foreign markets, is on a downward trajectory, according to both surveys: exports of goods were even lower than in 2024, which was already alarming because they did not reach the figures forecast at the time. Tourism, for example, not only recorded fewer visitors but also less revenue.

Social deterioration completes this unfavorable picture. Infant mortality increased, 182,506 families were identified as vulnerable, and more than 313,000 people remain disconnected from education and work, affecting the goal of “consolidating and developing social policies.”

A PAINFUL BALANCE

The Government Program appears technically sound in its design, but this does not negate the current contractionary trend in the Cuban economy. Progress has been made, perhaps in the budgetary sphere; however, it is insufficient given the magnitude of the crisis and the aspirations of the citizenry.

Nor would it be completely objective to fail to note that its implementation has faced intensified external factors, blockade, and financial persecution, along with unresolved structural problems such as state inefficiency and low productivity. In fact, President Miguel Díaz-Canel himself pointed out at that mid-year session of the National Assembly that “the country's current revenues are insufficient” to finance the recovery.

The diagnosis of the academics at the University of Havana is sobering, stating that “it is highly likely that the economy will contract again.” This could lead us to expect, not without some reason, that the Government Program, despite its technical coherence and ambitious scope, is doomed to manage the crisis without being able to overcome it. Meanwhile, the Cuban economy would continue to be immersed in a downward spiral, increasingly affecting the well-being of the population and postponing the development objectives set out in the document itself.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND OPACITY AS A BURDEN

As Díaz-Canel rightly pointed out in July 2024, the Program should be made public “so that it can be truly supported with popular participation and control.” This statement, included in the text itself, contrasts with the reality of an opaque implementation, which has so far limited precisely that citizen participation.

This delay in communication has had concrete and negative consequences. First, it limited the ability of economic actors, whether state-owned or not, to align themselves with the Program's objectives. Second, it hindered accountability for the actual progress of the 342 actions. Third, it confronts its authors with this question: if the Program is as technically sound as it appears, why was its public disclosure delayed for so long? The answer, beyond economic considerations, contains political keys that affect the credibility of the entire process and impact its chances of success in an already extremely adverse context.

The recognition of the “partial dollarization of the economy” and the goal of “restoring the convertibility of the national currency” show that the technicians understood the problem from a purely economic angle, proposing measures born of that rationality, such as gradually eliminating subsidies for products and replacing them with subsidies for people in need, along with the “updating,” i.e. an increase in electricity, water, transportation and fuel rates.

At the time, the mere possibility of this happening provoked such a reaction in public opinion, also expressed by Cuban parliamentarians, that there was no further talk of its eventual implementation... until now.

Putting it on the public agenda sounds like an attempt to break the vicious circle in which, without the necessary adjustments, the Cuban economy will continue to contract; but with the adjustments, there is a risk of social unrest.

Let us hope, however, that the appropriate lessons have been learned from what the implementation of a similar measure, but poorly managed from the point of view of political communication, could mean for the Revolution, as was the case in the middle of last year with the entry into force of the new rules for recharging the balance of private mobile lines and accessing the Internet from them. At that time, the credibility of the revolutionary institutions was ultimately undermined, as expressed in the unnecessary isolation of the Cuban Telecommunications Company (Etecsa in Spanish) in the face of a measure that was beyond its capabilities.

Learning from these mistakes could be very healthy for the next stages in the implementation of this program and also for the consultation process, which is already underway. A debate is beginning, which could be a healthy exercise in political participation, especially if citizens understand and analyze it from their own reality, with a proactive position that nurtures the program's edifying purposes.